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Abstract. I  argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is 
internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig 
criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence 
of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate 
account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence 
of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine 
command theory (DCT). Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically 
necessary connections but Craig fails to provide an adequate account of why 
these connections hold. Thus, Craig’s critique of non-theistic moral realism is at 
odds with his DCT. Since the critique and DCT are both essential elements of 
his defence of the moral argument, that defence is internally inconsistent.
1. INTroDuCTIoN
In a  variety of publications and debates, William Craig has defended 
a moral argument for God’s existence. Craig’s defence of the argument 
has recently been criticized by Wielenberg (2009) and morriston (2012). 
building on these criticisms, I  argue here that Craig’s defence of the 
moral  argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending 
the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism. one 
of his central criticisms of that view is that it posits the existence of 
certain logically necessary (in the broad sense; see Plantinga 1974: 
44-5) connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why 
such connections hold. Craig claims that this is unacceptable. Another 
component of Craig’s defence of the moral argument is an endorsement 
of a  particular version of the divine command theory (DCT). Craig’s 
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version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections but Craig 
fails to provide an adequate account of why these connections hold. Thus, 
Craig’s critique of non-theistic moral realism is at odds with his DCT. 
Since the critique and DCT are both essential elements of his defence of 
the moral argument, that defence is internally inconsistent.
II. CrAIG’S morAl ArGumeNT
At the heart of Craig’s moral argument is the contention that objective 
morality has a sound foundation if and only if God exists (Garcia and 
King 2009: 30). A moral claim is objectively true just in case it is true 
and  its truth is independent of human mental states in a  certain way. 
Craig explains:
[T]o say, for example, that the Holocaust was objectively wrong is to say 
that it was wrong even though the Nazis who carried it out thought that it 
was right and that it would still have been wrong even if the Nazis had won 
World War II and succeeded in exterminating or brainwashing everyone 
who disagreed with them. (Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong 2004: 17)
Assuming that there are objective moral truths just in case objective 
morality has a sound foundation, it follows that there are objective moral 
truths just in case God exists. From the additional premise that there are 
some objective ethical truths (which Craig takes to be obviously true; see 
Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong 2004: 21), it follows that God exists.
III. CrAIG’S VerSIoN oF DCT
To support his contention that God provides a  sound foundation for 
objective morality, Craig appeals to a version of DCT according to which 
(i) goodness = resemblance to the necessarily existing divine nature and 
(ii) moral obligation = being commanded by God (Garcia and King 
2009: 30, 168-73; this type of view is developed at great length in Adams 
1999). Critics of Craig’s moral argument often appeal to the so-called 
‘euthyphro problem’ in an effort to refute the claim that God provides 
a sound foundation for objective morality (see e.g. Craig and Sinnott-
Armstrong 2004: 350-6; Garcia and King 2009: 70-2, 108-9). There are 
a number of distinct objections that have come to be associated with the 
label ‘the euthyphro problem’. Among these is the objection that DCT 
implies that any action, no matter how horrendous, could be morally 
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obligatory. The thought is that God, being omnipotent, could command 
any act whatsoever. Since, according to DCT, for an act to be obligatory 
just is for it to be commanded by God, it allegedly follows that any act 
is at least possibly morally obligatory. The objector claims that this 
implication is implausible and hence DCT itself must be flawed; call this 
objection ‘the arbitrariness problem’ (the classic source of this particular 
worry is Cudworth 1996 [1731]: 14).
Craig is well aware of this objection; he notes that his version of DCT 
‘was formulated precisely so as to be immune’ to this objection (Garcia 
and King 2009: 172). The foundation of Craig’s answer to the arbitrariness 
problem is the claim that at least some of God’s commands are ‘necessary 
expressions’ of His nature and hence are ‘logically necessary’ (Garcia 
and King 2009: 173); call such commands ‘N-commands’.1 Suppose, 
for example, that the command not to rape is an N-command. What 
this means is that the fact that the divine nature exists entails that God 
issues a command not to rape. Given the assumption that to be morally 
obligatory = to be commanded by God (the second component of Craig’s 
version of DCT), it follows that the existence of the divine nature entails 
that there exists a moral obligation not to rape. Craig also maintains that 
the divine nature exists necessarily (Garcia and King 2009: 169-70); 
given this, it is also necessarily true that we are morally obligated not to 
rape. So, Craig’s answer to the arbitrariness worry is that DCT does not 
imply that every action is possibly morally obligatory; the divine nature 
places necessary constraints on which commands God could issue, 
thereby placing necessary constraints on which actions could be morally 
obligatory. Thus, Craig’s version of DCT entails:
P1: There are some divine commands, C1 ... Cn, such that the existence 
of the divine nature entails the issuing of C1 ... Cn.
IV. CrAIG’S SHoPPING lIST obJeCTIoN To NoN-THeISTIC 
morAl reAlISm
Non-theistic moral realism is the view that there are some objective 
moral truths that are not somehow grounded in God. To the extent 
that this view is plausible, Craig’s contention that objective morality has 
1 It is not clear whether Craig also means to advance the stronger claim that all 
divine commands are N-commands. For worries about this stronger claim, see murphy 
(2002: 22-4), and baggett and Walls (2011: 119-20).
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a  sound foundation only if God exists is undermined. Thus, refuting 
non-theistic moral realism is an important component of Craig’s defence 
of his moral argument.
Craig often characterizes non-theistic moral realism as a  ‘shopping 
list approach’, by which he means (at least in part) that it entails the 
existence of ungrounded objective moral truths. Wielenberg argues that 
‘both parties to the debate [Craig and non-theistic moral realists] are 
stuck with a “shopping list” approach; the only difference between them 
is the content of their respective lists’ (2009: 38-9). Similarly, morriston 
claims that ‘[n]o  matter what story you tell about the ontological 
ground of moral value, you must at some point come to your own full 
stop’ (2012:  29).2 Craig sometimes concedes this point. For example, 
commenting on his and Sinnott-Armstrong’s different explanations 
for the wrongness of rape, Craig observes that ‘the difference between 
the theist and Sinnott-Armstrong is not that one has an explanatory 
ultimate and the other does not. It is rather that the theist has a different 
explanatory ultimate’ (Garcia and King 2009: 173).
However, a closer look at Craig’s ‘shopping list’ worry suggests that it 
is, at bottom, a worry about unexplained logically necessary connections. 
Craig at one point notes that the non-theist moral realist might hold ‘that 
moral properties supervene necessarily on certain natural states’ (Garcia 
and King 2009: 179). In response to this suggestion, he asserts that we 
have no reason to think ‘given a naturalistic worldview [that] there are 
any moral properties or that they supervene on natural states’ (Garcia 
and King 2009: 180). In the next paragraph Craig introduces the familiar 
shopping list objection:
If our approach to metaethical theory is to be serious metaphysics rather 
than just a ‘shopping list’ approach, whereby one simply helps oneself to 
the supervenient moral properties ... needed to do the job, then some sort 
of explanation is required for why moral properties supervene on certain 
natural states. (Garcia and King 2009: 180, emphasis added)
Here, Craig seems to assert that any approach that posits supervenience 
relations without explaining them is in some way or another inadequate 
(see morriston 2012: 31). Supervenience is a purely logical relation. one 
set of properties b supervenes upon another set of properties A just in 
case any pair of logically possible worlds that are identical with respect 
2 For an interesting argument for the inadequacy of Craig’s favourite stopping point – 
a good God – see Koons (2012).
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to the properties in A are also identical with respect to the properties in 
b.3 Since supervenience is, at its core, a matter of the obtaining of various 
logically necessary connections, Craig’s complaint about supervenience 
appears to be a  complaint about the positing of unexplained logically 
necessary connections. In the quoted passage above, Craig speaks 
specifically of supervenience relations between natural and moral states 
and properties. but it is hard to imagine a plausible justification for the 
view that while positing unexplained logically necessary connections 
between natural and moral properties is unacceptable, positing 
unexplained logically necessary connections between other things 
is acceptable. At any rate, Craig nowhere offers any justification for 
such a view. So the most plausible reading of this and similar passages 
suggests that the central target of Craig’s complaint is the positing of 
logically necessary connections which are then left unexplained. If this is 
right, then Craig’s shopping list objection to non-theistic moral realism 
employs the following principle:
P2: Any approach to metaethics that posits logically necessary 
connections without adequately explaining why such connections 
hold is unacceptable
V. THe INCoNSISTeNCY IN CrAIG’S DeFeNCe
Consider some N-command. Craig at one point offers the following as 
an ‘explanatory ultimate: God commands us to love and not to harm one 
another’ (Garcia and King 2009: 173). Thus, this command is a  likely 
candidate for an N-command. As noted above, Craig’s DCT implies that 
N-commands are entailed by God’s nature; this is P1. However, as I argue 
below, Craig does not provide an adequate explanation for the existence 
of such necessary connections. If this is correct, then P2 implies that 
Craig’s DCT is inadequate.
Craig has relatively little to say about why any particular N-command 
might be entailed by God’s nature; typically, he is content to claim that 
‘God’s moral nature is expressed in relation to us in the form of divine 
3 many varieties of supervenience have been distinguished (see mclaughlin and 
bennett: 2011); the definition of supervenience given here is global, logical (again, in the 
broad sense) supervenience. This is the most relevant type of supervenience because 
this is the sort of supervenience that non-theistic moral realists typically maintain holds 
between natural and moral properties.
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commands ... these commands flow necessarily from his moral nature’ 
(moreland and Craig 2003: 491, emphasis added). Such remarks tell us 
little about how or why any particular N-command is entailed by the 
divine nature. However, he does say this: ‘[T]he theist can agree that 
God forbids rape because it is bad.’ (Garcia and King 2009: 173) but this 
fails to explain why God’s nature entails that God forbids rape. Craig 
emphasizes the distinction between moral goods and moral obligations, 
offering this example:
It is good that I become a wealthy philanthropist and support worthy 
causes throughout the globe; it is also good that I  forgo the pursuit of 
wealth to become a medical missionary to Chad. but obviously I cannot 
do both, since they are mutually exclusive. I am not, therefore, morally 
obligated to do both, though both are good. Goods, then, do not imply 
moral obligations. (Garcia and King 2009: 172)
Just as it is possible to face a situation in which one cannot avoid failing 
to perform an act that it would be good to perform, it is also possible to 
face a situation in which one cannot avoid performing some evil act or 
other. In such cases, performing an evil act is morally permissible (see 
Adams 1999: 283). So, just as goods do not imply moral obligations, evils 
do not imply moral wrongness. Since, on Craig’s view, for an act to be 
morally obligatory is for it to be commanded by God and for an act to be 
morally wrong is for it to be forbidden by God, it follows that the fact that 
an act is good does not entail that God commands it and the fact that an 
act is bad does not entail that God forbids it. Therefore, the fact that rape 
is bad cannot fully account for the alleged necessary connection between 
the divine nature and God’s command against rape.
Craig sometimes lists some of the character traits that he thinks God 
has: ‘[God] is by nature loving, generous, just, faithful, kind, and so forth.’ 
(Garcia and King 2009: 30) It might be thought that such a list provides 
the materials for explaining the connections between the divine nature 
and at least some N-commands. Consider the following: because God is 
loving, He necessarily commands that we love one another. This claim 
has a certain ring of plausibility to it, but notice that it posits a logically 
necessary connection between being loving and issuing the command 
that we love one another. P2 implies that unless Craig provides an 
explanation for this necessary connection, his meta-ethical approach 
is unacceptable. To my knowledge, Craig nowhere provides such an 
explanation.
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It might be suggested that explanation has to come to an end 
somewhere; don’t we eventually arrive at a  fundamental necessary 
connection, one such that we can see that it is true even if we cannot 
explain how or why it is true? I am sympathetic to this reply. However, 
it is not a reply that is available to Craig, for P2 sets a very high bar of 
adequacy for meta-ethical theories: they must not posit any unexplained 
necessary connections. The bar is so high, in fact, that Craig’s own meta-
ethical theory falls short.
At this point, one might wonder: what would count as an adequate 
explanation of a logically necessary connection? From Craig’s perspective, 
one likely answer is that one can explain a logically necessary connection 
between A and b if one can plausibly claim that A just is b. recall that on 
Craig’s view, goodness just is resemblance to God, and moral obligation 
just is being commanded by God. That is why Craig thinks he can 
adequately explain the logically necessary connections between God and 
goodness and between divine commands and moral obligation. It may 
be that Craig thinks that no corresponding strategy is available to the 
non-theist because there are no natural properties that could plausibly 
be claimed to constitute goodness and moral obligation. If Craig is 
right about that, then the non-theistic moral realist must posit logically 
necessary connections between natural properties and distinct moral 
properties – but since the non-theist cannot adequately explain these 
connections, her view runs afoul of P2. What Craig seems not to notice is 
that while his brand of DCT may avoid positing unexplained necessary 
connections between God and goodness and between moral obligation 
and divine commands, it does posit other unexplained necessary 
connections, thereby running afoul of P2. In this way, Craig is hoisted 
by his own petard.
Finally, it is worth noting an obstacle to explaining the alleged 
necessary connections between the divine nature and divine commands 
that emerges from traditional Christian theism itself. The obstacle is 
suggested by, for instance, the well-known declaration in Isaiah that ‘[f]or 
as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are [God’s] ways higher than 
your ways and [God’s] thoughts higher than your thoughts’ (Isaiah 55:9), 
as well as Paul’s remark that God’s judgments are ‘unsearchable’ and His 
ways ‘inscrutable’ (romans 11:33).4 Such passages suggest a substantial 
gap between human and divine knowledge. Stephen Wykstra says: 
4 Also relevant here are Job, and ecclesiastes 8:17.
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‘A modest proposal might be that [God’s] wisdom is to ours, roughly as 
an adult human’s is to a one-month old infant’s.’ (1984: 88) one area in 
which our understanding of reality may be notably inferior to God’s is 
knowledge of good and evil. michael bergmann suggests that ‘it wouldn’t 
be the least bit surprising if [axiological] reality far outstripped our 
understanding of it’ (2001: 284) and that for all we know, there are lots 
of goods, evils, and connections between good and evil of which human 
beings are unaware (bergmann 2009). This collection of ideas is the basis 
of the so-called ‘sceptical theist’ response to the evidential problem of evil. 
Craig appeals to sceptical theism himself in addressing the problem of 
evil (Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong 2004: 116-9). These ideas suggest that 
there is much about the divine nature that we do not know, particularly 
when it comes to God’s moral nature. And this suggests that there is likely 
an insurmountable barrier to our understanding of whatever necessary 
connections may obtain between the divine nature and at least some 
divine commands. I  noted earlier that Adams has provided the  most 
developed version of Craig’s brand of DCT. Adams emphasizes the 
transcendence of the divine nature, one of the implications of which is an 
inevitable limit to human beings’ ability to grasp it. Here is a particularly 
striking expression of this view:
The Holy [= the Good = the divine nature] is fascinating; the Holy is 
beautiful; the Holy is bliss; the Holy is just, the bible claims, though we 
may not understand its justice ... From a human point of view, the Holy 
has rough edges. It screams with the hawk and laughs with the hyenas. 
We cannot comprehend it. ... We are not the measure of all things, and 
have at best a very imperfect appreciation of the full dimensions of the 
good. (Adams 1999: 52)
This bodes ill for the prospects of providing adequate explanations for 
the necessary connections between the divine nature and any putative 
N-command.
VI. CoNCluSIoN
If the argument of this paper is correct, then Craig faces a  dilemma. 
To provide an adequate defence of his moral argument, Craig must 
defeat non-theistic moral realism. many of Craig’s criticisms of non-
theistic moral realism have been ably criticized by Wielenberg (2009) 
and morriston (2012). When pressed, Craig typically resorts to the 
‘shopping list’ objection described above; this is often his final critique 
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of non-theistic moral realism (see, for example, Craig and moreland 
2003:  493; Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong 2003: 171; and Garcia and 
King 2009: 180). However, once we see what lies at the heart of the 
shopping list objection, we see that this objection applies equally to 
Craig’s favoured version of DCT. moreover, it is precisely those aspects 
of Craig’s version of DCT that, according to Craig, enable that view to 
avoid the arbitrariness problem that make it susceptible to the shopping 
list objection. Craig’s dilemma, then, is this: to provide an adequate 
defence for his moral argument, Craig must both defeat non-theistic 
moral realism and answer the arbitrariness problem for DCT. but if I am 
right, he cannot accomplish both of these tasks – at least, not with the 
arguments and claims he has advanced so far.5
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